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The practical effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 
and Alice Corporation Pty. v. CLS Bank International has 
been to deny patent eligibility to innovative patent applica-
tions and patents, particularly in the fields of biotechnology 
and computer software. On July 5, 2016, the Federal Circuit 
in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc. 
ruled that the claimed methods of cryopreserving hepatocyte 
cells are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they 
are not directed to a natural phenomenon. The patentees dis-
covered that some cells in a hepatocyte pool could survive 
multiple freeze-thaw cycles. The claims recite a method of 
producing a preparation of hepatocytes that can be frozen and 
thawed at least twice. The method steps include freezing and 
thawing a sample of hepatocytes, performing density frac-
tionation to separate viable and non-viable cells, recovering 
the viable hepatocytes, and refreezing the recovered hepato-
cytes. The Federal Circuit decided that, although dependent 
on a natural phenomenon, the inventors’ claims were a patent 
eligible application of their natural discovery. As a result, the 
court may have opened up a new avenue for patent seekers to 
circumvent the restrictive eligibility requirements established 
by the Supreme Court. 
This Note provides a brief history of patent eligibility doc-
trine and the cases leading up to the decision in CellzDirect. 
It next analyzes the CellzDirect decision and its possible in-
terpretations. Finally, it argues that this case represents an 
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effort by the Federal Circuit to limit the Supreme Court's ex-
treme anti-patent position in Mayo and Alice by cabining the 
eligibility restrictions to diagnostic discoveries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to prevent patents from “tying up the funda-
mental building blocks of science,”1 the Supreme Court ruled 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. that a method of diagnostic testing to determine the op-
timal dosage of autoimmune disease drugs by monitoring 
certain metabolites in a patient’s blood was invalid because 
it was directed to a law of nature.2 Similarly, in order to de-
ny patent protection for innovations that are fundamentally 
non-technological in nature, the Court ruled in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank International that a method of mitigating settle-
ment risk in financial transactions by using a computer sys-
tem as a third-party intermediary was invalid for being di-
rected to an abstract idea.3 In doing so, it built upon the two-
step framework for distinguishing a patent-ineligible concept 
from an application of the patent-ineligible concept. First, 
the Court must determine whether a patent claim at issue is 
“directed to” one of three patent-ineligible concepts—law of 
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.4 Second, if the 
answer is yes, the court must then search for an “inventive 
 
1 Christopher M. Holman, The Mayo Framework Is Bad for Your 
Health, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 901, 911 (2016). 
2 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 72 
(2012). 
3 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351–52 (2014). For a 
brief history of eligibility doctrine, see Appendix, infra.  
4 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
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concept” that transforms the nature of the claim into a pa-
tent-eligible application.5 
The practical effect of Mayo and Alice has been to deny 
patent eligibility to innovative patent applications and pa-
tents, particularly in the fields of biotechnology and comput-
er software.6 For example, this framework was used to deny 
patent eligibility for a non-invasive method of accessing fetal 
DNA using previously discarded cell-free cffDNA and a 
method for gene detection by amplifying and analyzing sig-
nificantly shorter “non-coding regions known to be linked to 
the coding region” of interest.7 
On July 5, 2016, however, the Federal Circuit in Rapid 
Litigation Management v. CellzDirect, Inc., ruled that the 
claimed methods of cryopreserving hepatocyte cells were eli-
gible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they were not directed to 
a natural phenomenon.8 The claims recite a method of pro-
ducing a preparation of hepatocytes “capable of being frozen 
and thawed at least two times.”9 The process consists of 
freezing and thawing a sample of hepatocytes, performing 
density fractionation to separate viable and non-viable cells, 
recovering the viable hepatocytes, and refreezing the recov-
ered hepatocytes.10 This method also allows for the previous-
ly impractical practice of pooling hepatocytes from different 
samples to create a heterogeneous sample.11 
The Federal Circuit determined that although the “inven-
tors certainly discovered the cells’ ability to survive multiple 
 
5 Id. at 2357. 
6 See generally Warren Woessner, Rapid Litigation v. CellzDirect – A 
Break in the Section 101 Wall, NAT’L L. REV. (July 5, 2016), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/rapid-litigation-v-cellzdirect-break-
section-101-wall [perma.cc/8P2S-7HMD]; Michael A. Sanzo, The Patenting 
of Gene Based Diagnostic Assays in a Post Mayo and Myriad World, 16 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2016).  
7 Ariosa v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Genetic Techs. 
Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
8 Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1044 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
9 Id. at 1046. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1045–46. 
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freeze-thaw cycles . . . that is not where they stopped, nor is 
it what they patented.”12 Instead, the inventors “employed 
their natural discovery to create a new and improved way of 
preserving hepatocyte cells for later use.”13 As a result, the 
court may have created a new avenue for patent seekers to 
circumvent the restrictive eligibility requirements estab-
lished by the Supreme Court.14 
This Note provides a brief description of the Supreme 
Court’s Mayo/Alice test and the Federal Circuit cases leading 
up to the decision in CellzDirect. It next analyzes the 
CellzDirect decision and its possible interpretations. Finally, 
it argues that this case represents an effort by the Federal 
Circuit to limit the Supreme Court’s extreme anti-patent po-
sition in Mayo and Alice by cabining the eligibility re-
strictions to diagnostic discoveries. 
II. THE RESTRICTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
A. The Mayo and Alice Framework 
Court decisions have articulated the Mayo/Alice test as a 
simple two-step inquiry in which the court first determines 
whether the claim at issue is “directed to” a natural phenom-
enon, law of nature, or an abstract idea.15 If so, it next con-
siders whether the elements of the claim, “individually [or] 
as an ordered combination . . . transform the nature of the 
claim into a patent-eligible application.”16 
1. Step One: Directed to a Patent-Ineligible 
Exception? 
The first step of the Mayo and Alice analysis is to deter-
mine “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of [the] 
 
12 Id. at 1048. 
13 Id. 
14 Woessner, supra note 6. 
15 See, e.g., DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1255 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
16 Id. 
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patent-ineligible concepts”—laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas.17 The Court in Mayo reasoned that 
“even though rewarding with patents those who discover 
new laws of nature and the like might well encourage their 
discovery, those laws and principles, considered generally, 
are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work.’”18 
The Court was particularly worried about the danger in 
granting patents based on these concepts that would “tie up 
their use,” thus preventing further innovation.19 Despite this 
concern, the courts in Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and Alice de-
clined to elaborate on these categories themselves and in-
stead simply asserted that the claims at issue were each di-
rected at an ineligible concept.20  
Similarly, Federal Circuit cases have done little to clarify 
this first step. In many patent eligibility cases, the Federal 
Circuit has quickly disposed of this step by simply declaring 
that the claim is directed to one of the exceptions.21 Howev-
er, a select number of cases do provide some guidance. In 
2015, the Federal Circuit described a law of nature as “exact 
statements of physical relationships, deduced from scientific 
observations of natural phenomena . . . [and] often repre-
sented by equations.”22 In addition, cases such as Ariosa and 
 
17 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing 
Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012)).  
18 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972)). 
19 Id. 
20 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Ju-
risprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 647, 656 (2015); see also 
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the 
precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case. It is enough to 
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of 
risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue 
here. Both are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have 
used that term.”). See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
21 See Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. 
CLS Bank, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 542–44 (2015). 
22 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
applied the natural phenomena category to nature-based 
products.23 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit described an 
abstract-idea claim as an “ordered combination of steps 
[that] recites an abstraction—an idea, having no particular 
concrete or tangible form.”24 This includes “mathematical al-
gorithms, including those executed on a generic computer, 
. . . [and] some fundamental economic and conventional 
business practices.”25  
2. Step Two: Significantly More than the 
Exception Itself? 
The Supreme Court described the second step of the 
framework as a “search for an ‘inventive concept.’”26 A pa-
tent claim directed to an ineligible concept can survive if it 
contains “an element or combination of elements that is ‘suf-
ficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to sig-
nificantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] 
itself.’”27 This second step is crucial because, as the Mayo de-
cision noted, “all inventions at some level embody, use, re-
flect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas.”28 Additionally, the Mayo Court empha-
sized that a mere recitation of a law of nature with the di-
rective to “apply it” appended to the end is not deserving of 
patent protection.29 Unfortunately, the Court has declined to 
 
23 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110–11 (2013). 
24 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
25 DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
26  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 80–81 
(2012)). 
27 Id. 
28 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. 
29 Id. at 72. 
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elaborate on the “inventive concept” necessary beyond estab-
lishing the “apply it” floor.30 
The Federal Circuit has not been able to do much to sim-
plify the inquiry.31 For example, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hu-
lu, L.L.C., the Federal Circuit applied a seemingly endless 
number of tests gathered from all of the Supreme Court’s 
precedents to determine that Ultramercial’s claim of offering 
copyrighted media to consumers in exchange for watching 
advertisements was “an abstract idea, devoid of a concrete or 
tangible application.”32 The court decided that the additional 
features were well understood, routine, or conventional; the 
steps were specified at a high level of generality; the steps 
were merely data gathering steps; the claims only represent-
ed insignificant pre-solution activity; the process was just a 
drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea it-
self; and the fact that the steps were limited to a technologi-
cal arena where it was not previously employed and the con-
cept’s application to the Internet was not enough to pass the 
machine or transformation test.33 In addition, because of the 
Supreme Court’s vagueness, there is a potential for a new 
test or factor to examine in the second step of the Mayo/Alice 
framework with every new § 101 case.34 
B. The Federal Circuit Post-Alice 
Although the two-step analysis test is vague, the Federal 
Circuit has used it to invalidate most of the patents before it 
on eligibility grounds.35 Post-Alice, it had held every chal-
 
30 Lefstin, supra note 20, at 656. 
31 John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A 
Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1772 (2014). 
32 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
33 Id. at 716. See also Lefstin, supra note 20, at 657. 
34 See Golden, supra note 31, at 1772. 
35 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CHART OF SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY COURT DECISIONS (2017) [hereinafter ELIGIBILITY COURT DECI-
SIONS], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-sme_crt_ 
dec.xlsx [perma.cc/235Z-SUJ2]; Tran, supra note 21, at 541; Jasper L. 
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lenged biotechnology patent ineligible until CellzDirect.36 In 
the period between Alice and CellzDirect, the Federal Circuit 
reviewed twenty-five cases on § 101 grounds and found all 
but three ineligible.37 While this Note focuses on biotechnol-
ogy patents, it is important to take a quick look at the three 
computer patents that were held eligible between Alice and 
CellzDirect because the Alice Court suggested that abstract 
ideas and laws of nature may be similarly evaluated.38 
1. Before CellzDirect, Only Three Federal Circuit 
§ 101 Cases Found a Patent Eligible 
The Federal Circuit first held a post-Alice patent eligible 
in DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com.39 The claims at issue 
were directed at the practice of generating websites that can 
“display a third-party merchant’s products, but retain its vis-
itor traffic by displaying this product information from with-
in a generated web page that ‘gives the viewer of the page 
the impression that she is viewing pages served by the host’ 
website.”40  
Interestingly, the DDR Holdings court found that the 
claims cleared the § 101 hurdle in an analysis of the second 
step of the Alice/Mayo framework, but declined to identify in 
the first step the precise nature of the abstract idea underly-
ing the claims.41 The Federal Circuit’s finding of an in-
ventive concept seems to expand on language in Alice that 
claims can be patent eligible if they “effect an improvement 
 
Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 354, 359 (2015). 
36 See ELIGIBILITY COURT DECISIONS, supra note 35. 
37 See, e.g., DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, 827 F.3d 1341 
(Fed Cir. 2016). See also ELIGIBILITY COURT DECISIONS, supra note 35 
(comparing recent Federal Circuit decisions under § 101). 
38 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014). 
39 DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1255. 
40 Id. at 1249. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,629,135, col. 2 ll. 56–63, col. 
3 ll. 20–22). 
41 Id. at 1256–57, 1259. 
KIM – FINAL 
1166 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
in [a] . . . technology or technical field.”42 It reasoned that ra-
ther than “broadly and generically claim[ing] ‘use of the In-
ternet’ to perform an abstract business practice (with insig-
nificant added activity) . . . the claimed solution is 
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to over-
come a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer 
networks.”43 This seems to add yet another test to be consid-
ered in the Alice/Mayo second step: whether the claims solve 
a specific problem “rooted in” a particular technology. 
The next patent to be upheld by the Federal Circuit did 
not come until 2016—almost two years after Alice—in En-
fish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.44 The court seemed to diverge 
from previous cases by declaring that the two-step “formula-
tion plainly contemplates that the first step of the inquiry is 
a meaningful one . . . because essentially every routinely pa-
tent-eligible claim involving physical products and actions 
involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon.”45 For 
the first time, the Federal Circuit ruled that a challenged pa-
tent was not an abstract idea at all.46  
First, the court embraced the idea that the abstract-idea 
category has not been defined and “found it sufficient to 
compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be 
directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.”47 In Enfish, 
the invention “improve[d] upon prior art information search 
and retrieval systems by employing a flexible, self-referential 
table to store data.”48 Although the Supreme Court in Alice 
discussed improvements to a computer’s function or an exist-
ing technological process in its second step of the Mayo anal-
ysis, the Federal Circuit declined to view Alice as “broadly 
 
42 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. 
43 DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–58. 
44 Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
45 Id. at 1335.  
46 Tran, supra note 35, at 365. 
47 Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334.  
48 Id. at 1337. 
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hold[ing] that all improvements in computer-related technol-
ogy are inherently abstract.”49  
Second, the Federal Circuit found that “the plain focus of 
the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality 
itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is 
used in its ordinary capacity.”50 Accordingly, it found the 
claims to not be directed to an abstract idea and upheld the 
patent.51 It is important to note that the court warned that 
“describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and 
untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures 
that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.”52 
While Enfish provides an explanation of Alice’s first step, 
the next opinion to uphold a patent provides insight into the 
second step.53 In BASCOM v. AT&T, the Federal Circuit an-
alyzed the eligibility of an internet-content filtering sys-
tem.54  
The claimed filtering system is located on a remote Inter-
net Service Provider (“ISP”) server that associates each net-
work account with (1) one or more filtering schemes and (2) 
at least one set of filtering elements from a plurality of sets 
of filtering elements, thereby allowing individual network 
accounts to customize the filtering of Internet traffic associ-
ated with the account.55  
The district court previously invalidated the patent as di-
rected to the abstract idea of “filtering content” because it 
found internet content to be akin to any other medium, such 
as books, magazines, television, or movies.56 
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded based on the 
second step of the Mayo/Alice test.57 Surprisingly, it cited 
 
49 Id. at 1335.  
50 Id. at 1336. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1337. 
53 See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, 827 F.3d 
1341 (Fed Cir. 2016). 
54 Id. at 1343. 
55 Id. at 1345. 
56 Id. at 1346–47. 
57 Id. at 1352. 
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Enfish for the proposition that in computer-related claims in 
which there are “close calls about how to characterize what 
the claims are directed to . . . [the] analysis of whether there 
are arguably concrete improvements in the recited computer 
technology could take place under step two.”58 The court rec-
ognized that the claims were directed to filtering Internet 
content, but it found that filtering content in and of itself is 
an abstract idea.59 Thus, the court skipped the first step of 
the test because the claims here were not “unambiguously 
directed to an improvement in computer capabilities,” as 
they were in Enfish.60 
In its analysis of the second step, the court agreed “with 
the district court that the limitations of the claims, taken in-
dividually, recite generic computer, network and Internet 
components, none of which is inventive by itself.”61 However, 
it also recognized that “an inventive concept can be found in 
the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of 
known, conventional pieces.”62 Thus, it found that the patent 
described an inventive concept because it recites “a specific, 
discrete implementation of the abstract idea of filtering con-
tent . . . and the patent describes how its particular ar-
rangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior 
art ways of filtering such content.”63 The court analogized 
the claims to those in DDR Holdings, because BASCOM also 
claimed a technology-based solution, in this case, “to filter 
content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems 
with other Internet filtering systems.”64 
 
58 Id. at 1348 (quoting Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 
1327, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 1349. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1350. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1351.  
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III. RAPID LITIGATION V. CELLZDIRECT TO THE 
RESCUE? 
With the Enfish and BASCOM cases, the Federal Circuit 
set the stage for the fourth post-Alice case upholding a pa-
tent—this time in relation to the laws of nature in the bio-
technology sphere. In Enfish, the court established that a pa-
tent can survive the § 101 threshold if the claims are 
“unambiguously directed to a technological improvement” 
and thus not an abstract idea or law of nature.65 If the “di-
rected to” question is a “close call” in step one, BASCOM al-
lows inventors to argue that the patent is eligible under step 
two by showing that the specific arrangement of elements in 
the claim amounts to an improved technological process.66 
Thus, in the software context, the steps seem to have col-
lapsed into one because a computer is itself a technological 
innovation. Software that improves computer function or 
solves a computer-specific problem will pass the test. Howev-
er, the Federal Circuit left open the question of what to do if 
a biological discovery improves some bodily function or solves 
a specific biomedical problem. 
A. The Case: The Federal Circuit Strikes Back 
1. The Claims At Issue in CellzDirect 
Hepatocytes are a type of liver tissue used extensively for 
“biomedical research, including a variety of biological, phar-
macological, and toxicological studies.”67 For example, 
hepatocytes can be used as model systems for the study of 
liver functions including drug toxicity and efficacy.68 Howev-
er, these model systems are limited because “fresh hepato-
cytes can only be obtained from liver resections or non-
transplantable livers of organ donors, and their lifespan is 
 
65 Tran, supra note 35, at 370. 
66 Id. 
67 Edward L. LeCluyse & Eliane Alexandre, Isolation and Culture of 
Primary Hepatocytes from Rescued Human Liver Tissue, in 640 METHODS 
IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 57, 57 (John M. Walker ed., 2010). 
68 U.S. Patent No. 7,604,929 col. 1 ll. 37–39 (filed Oct. 20, 2009). 
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short . . . Supply is thus erratic, making availability limited 
and unpredictable.”69 Extant cryopreservation techniques to 
freeze these cells for later use led to cell damage and poor re-
covery rates of viable cells once thawed.70 “These methods 
generally comprised freezing hepatocytes at frigid tempera-
tures; then, when needed, thawing them and recovering the 
viable cells using density gradient fractionation.”71  
In addition, “[b]ecause hepatocytes from different donors 
generally have different metabolic properties, researchers 
desired to pool hepatocytes from various source livers” to 
study cells with varied liver-enzyme expression.72 However, 
not only did the prior preservation method lead to poor re-
covery, but the need for donated cells to be preserved imme-
diately made producing pooled samples from multiple donors 
difficult.73 Moreover, although the cells could be mixed after 
thawing several frozen samples, the existing belief that the 
hepatocytes could only be frozen once led to the presumption 
that the entire resulting pool had to be used immediately.74 
The inventors “discovered that some fraction of hepato-
cytes [is] capable of surviving multiple freeze-thaw cycles.”75 
Using this discovery, they developed a process for making a 
mixed population of frozen hepatocytes with heightened via-
bility.76 Claim 1 of the ‘929 patent recites: 
1. A method of producing a desired preparation of 
multi-cryopreserved hepatocytes, said hepatocytes, 
being capable of being frozen and thawed at least two 
times, and in which greater than 70% of the hepato-
cytes of said preparation are viable after the final 
thaw, said method comprising: 
 





73 See ‘929 Patent col. 3. ll. 5–8, 50–53. 
74 See id. at col. 3. ll. 49–56.  
75 CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1045. 
76 Id. 
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(A) subjecting hepatocytes that have been frozen and 
thawed to density gradient fractionation to separate 
viable hepatocytes from nonviable hepatocytes, 
(B) recovering the separated viable hepatocytes, and 
(C) cryopreserving the recovered viable hepatocytes 
to thereby form said desired preparation of hepato-
cytes without requiring a density gradient step after 
thawing the hepatocytes for the second time, wherein 
the hepatocytes are not plated between the first and 
second cryopreservations, and wherein greater than 
70% of the hepatocytes of said preparation are viable 
after the final thaw.77 
2. The District Court Decision 
The district court employed the Alice two-step method 
and invalidated the patent.78 It found that “the patent re-
cites the natural law that certain hepatocytes are capable of 
being frozen and thawed more than once.”79 In analyzing the 
inventive concept step, the court ruled that the multiple 
freezing steps were insufficient to transform the process into 
patentable material.80 It reasoned that because the patentee 
“reapplied a well-understood freezing process,” the claim 
“amount[ed] to a straightforward application of the truth 
that hepatocytes are inherently capable of surviving multiple 
freeze-thaw cycles.”81 
3. The Federal Circuit Decision 
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded. At step one, 
the court decided the claims were not “directed to” the natu-
ral phenomenon that some hepatocyte cells can survive mul-
tiple freeze-thaw cycles.82 Although the innovation rests on 
 
77 ‘929 Patent col. 19 ll. 56–63, col. 20 ll. 12–20.  
78 See Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 783 
(N.D. Ill. 2015). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 784. 
81 Id. 
82 Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016).  
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this ability of hepatocytes to be frozen twice, the court recog-
nized “that the claims are simply not directed to the ability of 
hepatocytes to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles.”83 It 
found that these claims “are directed to a new and useful la-
boratory technique for preserving hepatocytes.”84 “This type 
of constructive process, carried out by an artisan to achieve 
‘a new and useful end,’ is precisely the type of claim that is 
eligible for patenting.”85 It noted that “[t]he resulting prepa-
ration, and the process for creating it, achieved a notable ad-
vance over prior art techniques for preserving hepato-
cytes.”86 The court contended that, rather than simply 
claiming their discovery, the inventors “employed their natu-
ral discovery to create a new and improved way of preserving 
hepatocyte cells for later use.”87 It distinguished these claims 
from patent-ineligible concepts that “amounted to nothing 
more than observing or identifying the ineligible concept it-
self.”88 
The court also warned that almost any process can be de-
scribed in terms of natural laws, which would allow a court 
to  
find patent-ineligible methods of, say, producing a 
new compound (as directed to the individual compo-
nents’ ability to combine to form the new compound), 
treating cancer with chemotherapy (as directed to 
cancer cells’ inability to survive chemotherapy), or 
treating headaches with aspirin (as directed to the 
human body’s natural response to aspirin).89  
According to the court, this reasoning was especially rele-
vant to claim 5, “which requires the additional step of pool-
ing cells from multiple donors,” because it “results in a prep-
 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 
(2014)). 
86 Id. at 1047. 
87 Id. at 1048. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1049. 
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aration that is both new and vastly more useful for research 
than hepatocyte preparations made by conventional meth-
ods.”90 Although the hepatocyte pool itself may not be patent 
eligible, the court ruled that this case was distinguishable 
from the multi-strain bacteria mixture at issue in Funk Bros. 
because the patent was not a resulting product, but rather 
the process of creating one.91 
Even if it were directed to a natural phenomenon, the 
Federal Circuit argued that the patent improves an existing 
technological process sufficiently to “transform the process 
into an inventive application” of the phenomenon.92 It is “eli-
gible because it applies the discovery that hepatocytes can be 
twice frozen to achieve a new and useful preservation pro-
cess.”93 Further, under Diamond v. Diehr, “a new combina-
tion of steps in a process may be patentable even though all 
the constituents of the combination were well known and in 
common use before the combination was made.”94 The 
CellzDirect court focused on the fact that “the prior art 
taught away from multiple freezing steps,”95 and that 
“[r]epeating a step that the art taught should be performed 
only once can hardly be considered routine or convention-
al.”96 The particular “combination of steps” as an application 




91 Id. at 1049–50 (“It is the process of preservation that is patent eli-
gible here, not necessarily the end product. In any event, LTC’s argument 
proves too much: if LTC were correct, no one could ever get a patent on 
cryopreservation, or on any other innovative method that acts on some-
thing that is naturally occurring, simply because of the nature of the un-
derlying subject matter.”). 
92 Id. at 1050 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2358 (2014)). 
93 Id. at 1050–51. 
94 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
95 CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. 
CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  
96 Id. at 1051. 
97 Id. at 1051 (quoting Diamond, 450 U.S. at 188). 
KIM – FINAL 
1174 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
Finally, the court conceded that once the inventor discov-
ered that some cells could survive multiple freeze-thaw cy-
cles, the task of refreezing the viable cells might have been 
simple or obvious.98 Still, the “ease of execution or obvious-
ness of application” is not a factor in the § 101 analysis but 
rather a question to be asked under other Patent Act provi-
sions.99 The court also noted that the patent at issue does 
not run into the preemption problems that served as the cen-
tral policy consideration that “undergirds . . . § 101 jurispru-
dence.”100 It recognized that the patent “does not lock up the 
natural law in its entirety” and that “LTC has already man-
aged to engineer around the patent.”101 This marked the first 
sign of relief from the Federal Circuit in the life sciences 
arena but, as discussed in Part IV, infra, the holding can be 
interpreted many ways.102 
IV. THE DECISION SAVES BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PATENTS EXCEPT FOR DIAGNOSTICS 
The Federal Circuit validated the hepatocyte cryopreser-
vation method by plainly stating that the claim was not “di-
rected to” a natural phenomenon because it was not merely 
the discovery that hepatocytes can be frozen twice.103 It also 
held that even if it were, the patent presented an unconven-
tional “combination of steps” because the prior art taught 
away from freezing twice.104 Some see this decision as a 
turning point for the life sciences industry.105 Broadly inter-
 
98 Id. at 1052. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 
(2014)). 
101 Id. (quoting Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 
774, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2015)). 
102 See Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Gives Patent Eligibility Relief to 
Life Sciences Sector, IPWATCHDOG (Jul. 5, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/07/05/federal-circuit-patent-eligibility-
life-sciences [perma.cc/JFJ4-BY5J].  
103 CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1048. 
104 Id. at 1051 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)). 
105 See Quinn, supra note 100. 
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preted, the language in this decision can be used to find eli-
gible all of the biotechnology patents the circuit previously 
invalidated. However, interpreted narrowly, this decision 
does not even apply to any of the precedent. This Section 
suggests that the former is the correct reading and the Fed-
eral Circuit is essentially cabining Mayo’s extreme anti-
patent reach from anything except for diagnostic methods 
that do not also include a method of treatment. 
A. A New Explanation of the Mayo/Alice Test 
1. Eligible As Long As the Claim Is Not “Directed 
to” the Natural Law 
According to CellzDirect, courts should use the plain 
claim language to make the “directed to” determination.106 
“At step one, therefore, it is not enough to merely identify a 
patent-ineligible concept underlying the claim; the court 
must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is 
what the claim is ‘directed to.’”107 Thus, the broadest inter-
pretation of CellzDirect would allow patentees to skirt 
around the eligibility rules by arguing that a patent is di-
rected to anything other than the diagnostic discovery. For 
example, one could try to argue that because they include a 
specific metabolite range to indicate efficacy, the claims in 
Mayo were directed to a new and useful method of treatment 
rather than merely the correlation between the drug and its 
metabolites. This of course would be preposterous because 
the patent in Mayo did not actually contain a treatment step 
to implement once the effective dosage had been calculated. 
A patentee could also potentially use clever claim drafting, 
but this would surely go against the Supreme Court’s worry 
in Parker v. Flook that “mak[ing] the determination of pa-
tentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman’s 
art . . . would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibi-
tion against patents for ‘ideas’ or phenomena of nature.”108 
 
106 CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1050. 
107 Id. 
108 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
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Therefore, this decision can be interpreted as holding pa-
tents eligible as long as the end result is not just information 
or a mental step such as comparing, determining, or detect-
ing. In fact, the court stated that “comparing two sequences 
to detect alterations is a patent-ineligible ‘abstract mental 
process.’”109 It added that although claims may employ 
method steps, if “the end result of the process, the essence of 
the whole, [i]s a patent-ineligible concept” the claims fall un-
der the first step in Mayo.110 This would invalidate most di-
agnostics where the end result is detection of a disease. Of 
course, the narrowest interpretation could be that the 
hepatocyte preservation patent is only eligible because the 
end result is a tangible product; therefore, all diagnostics 
would be invalid—with the exception of self-contained diag-
nostic kits. However, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Federal Circuit has suggested that diagnostics are categori-
cally ineligible. This leaves a middle ground between a pure 
diagnostic method and a manufacturing method. 
In CellzDirect, “[t]he inventors certainly discovered the 
cells’ ability to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles, but that 
is not where they stopped, nor is it what they patented.”111 
Thus, the fractioning step in the hepatocyte preservation is 
analogous to a diagnostic method. Discovering that some 
cells are viable following a second freeze-thaw step and sort-
ing the viable cells by gradient fractionation is akin to dis-
covering a genetic marker for a disease and screening pa-
tients based on the marker. However, according to the 
Federal Circuit, the inventor cannot stop there.112 This sug-
gests that an inventor must apply some sort of treatment to 
these sorted patients to escape the “directed to” analysis of 
the Mayo/Alice test. 
2. Eligible if the Claimed Method Goes Against 
 
109 CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1048 (quoting In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-




112 See id. 
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the Prior Art 
Even if the fact that the end result of a claim is not a tan-
gible product places the claim into a judicial exception in the 
first Mayo/Alice step, the CellzDirect analysis under the se-
cond step could still give patent eligibility relief to diagnostic 
tests. The court states that “the individual steps of freezing 
and thawing were well known, but a process of preserving 
hepatocytes by repeating those steps was itself far from rou-
tine and conventional.”113 It noted that the prior art in 
hepatocyte preservation taught away from a second freezing 
step.114 Even though adding a novel unconventional limita-
tion would allow a patent directed to a judicial exception to 
be eligible under Mayo, the CellzDirect court stated that the 
obviousness of application should not be a consideration un-
der § 101.115 This is a looser standard than the “significantly 
more” standard set out in Mayo.116 Under this reading, mak-
ing a diagnosis and applying a well-known or obvious treat-
ment would be enough to survive the second hurdle. Indeed, 
CellzDirect suggests that a claim could bypass the substan-
tial step test as long as it “does not lock up the natural law in 
its entirety.”117 It further noted the fact that the would-be in-
fringer already managed to engineer around the patent tilts 
in favor of patent eligibility.118 
B. The USPTO’s Response: Nothing Has Changed 
In response to the CellzDirect case, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) issued a memorandum to 
address the case’s effect on the USPTO’s current subject 
 
113 Id. at 1051. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1052. 
116 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 
77 (2012). 
117 CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. 
CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2015)). 
118 Id. (quoting Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 
774, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2015)). 
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matter eligibility guidance and training examples.119 The 
memo noted that the decision’s emphasis on the need to 
scrutinize the claims’ focus in the “directed to” analysis in 
step one is consistent with Enfish.120 The USPTO also reit-
erated that “these claims that apply a law of nature are dis-
tinguishable from the claims in Mayo and Sequenom that 
were found to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept when 
they ‘amounted to nothing more than observing or identify-
ing the ineligible concept itself.’”121 Finally, the USPTO 
wrote that its “current subject matter eligibility guidance . . . 
and training examples are consistent with these points.”122 
Interestingly, the USPTO examples in its guidelines indi-
cate that it has already adopted the anti-diagnostic position 
suggested by this Note.123 In the example of a patent for di-
agnosing disease, the guidelines state that a method of diag-
nosing a diseased patient by detecting the presence of a cer-
tain protein in the plasma sample is ineligible.124 However, a 
method of diagnosing the disease is eligible where it includes 
detection of a protein using a particular antibody or treat-
ment of the diagnosed patient using a known drug in the 
field.125 The guidelines further state that “[t]he totality of 
these steps including the recitation of a particular treatment 
. . . integrate the exception into the diagnostic and treatment 
process, and amount to more than merely diagnosing a pa-
tient . . . and instructing a doctor to generically ‘treat it.’”126 
This accords with the above interpretation of CellzDirect that 
 
119 ROBERT W. BAHR, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MEMORAN-
DUM: RECENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY RULINGS (July 14, 2016) [here-
inafter RAPID MEMO], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
memo_rlm-sequenom.pdf [perma.cc/L6QY-5YFT]. 
120 Id. at 2. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, SUBJECT MATTER ELIGI-
BILITY EXAMPLES: LIFE SCIENCES (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter EXAMPLES: LIFE 
SCIENCES], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-
2016-ex.pdf [perma.cc/Z57M-HNXX]. 
124 Id. at 11–12.  
125 Id. at 13–16. 
126 Id. at 15. 
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while a method of diagnosis alone is ineligible, a method of 
treatment in which diagnosis is merely a step is eligible. 
Furthermore, in another training example, the USPTO 
guidelines state that a method for comparing a subject’s 
DNA sequence and wild-type sequences, in which differences 
indicate an alteration in a certain gene, is ineligible.127 It 
reasons that such a method is directed to a natural law be-
cause there is no limit on how the comparison is per-
formed.128 Thus, it relies on the mental step distinction con-
templated by CellzDirect. The USPTO also would hold 
ineligible a claim for detecting conformational changes indic-
ative of a mutation that only entails “hybridizing a wild-type 
probe” to the sample.129 However, the guidelines further note 
that a claim in which the detection of conformational chang-
es uses scanning near-field optical microscopy (“SNOM”) 
would be eligible because SNOM, although known at the 
time, was not actually routinely or conventionally used.130 
The claim still contains the mental step that conformational 
changes are indicative of an alteration, but under the guide-
lines, the simple addition of SNOM would be a significant 
addition to the natural law.131 The USPTO would similarly 
find eligible a method of analysis by using a sequencing 
method that was non-routine or unconventional at the time, 
such as Cool-Melt PCR.132 Notably, the guidelines do not re-
quire that the hybridization techniques be completely novel, 
but rather just unconventional.133 Without a definition of 
unconventional, this analysis could eventually stretch so 
that simply specifying the method of analysis would suf-
fice.134  
 
127 Id. at 25. 
128 See id. 
129 Id. at 26. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 26. 
132 See id. at 27–28. 
133 Id. at 23. 
134 Perhaps this is unsurprising because, according to Mayo, the steps 
of administering a drug to a patient and determining the resultant level of 
metabolite in the patient “are not themselves natural laws.” Mayo Collab-
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C. Subsequent Decisions: Return of Mayo 
As of September 1, 2017, five of the thirty-nine patents 
reviewed by the Federal Circuit on § 101 grounds post 
CellzDirect have been found eligible.135 All related to com-
puter software and abstract ideas.136 Four escaped § 101 in-
eligibility on the first “directed to” prong of the Mayo/Alice 
test.137 The court used the reasoning found in Enfish that 
patents “focus[ing] on a specific means or method that im-
proves the relevant technology” are eligible to validate pa-
tents for animating lip synchronization and facial expres-
sions by coding rules into a computer,138 creating a graphical 
user interface to prevent ordering of financial instruments at 
a changed price,139 tracking more efficiently an object on a 
moving platform by tracking motion relative to the platform 
rather than the Earth,140 and creating a universal computer 
memory system with programmable characteristics based on 
the processor.141 The fifth—a system allowing network pro-
 
orative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 67 (2012). It seems incon-
sonant to hold as a natural law the steps of hybridizing a probe to a specif-
ic DNA sequence and determining the resultant conformational changes. 
135 ELIGIBILITY COURT DECISIONS, supra note 35. See also McRO, Inc. 
v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Amdocs 
(Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Trad-
ing Techs. Int’l v. CQG Inc., 675 Fed. Appx. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Thales 
Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Visual 
Memory L.L.C. v. Nvidia Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed Cir. 2017); Jason 
Rantanen, BASCOM v. AT&T: Section 101 Jurisprudence Continues to 
Develop, PATENTLYO (July 19, 2016), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/07/jurisprudence-continues-develop.html 
[perma.cc/T6L6-QLU8].  
136 ELIGIBILITY COURT DECISIONS, supra note 35. 
137 McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316; Trading Techs., 675 Fed. Appx. at 1006; 
Thales, 850 F.3d at 1349; Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1262.  
138 McRO, 837 F.3d at 1307–08, 1314 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).  
139 Trading Techs., 675 Fed. Appx. at 1003. 
140 Thales, 850 F.3d at 1344–45.  
141 Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1256. 
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viders to account and bill for network communications—
recited an inventive concept, according to the court.142 
1. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health 
Diagnostics 
While the Federal Circuit has run with Enfish and BAS-
COM to find several computer patents eligible, the same has 
not happened in biotechnology cases. The only biotech case 
heard by the court in the same period was Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics.143 In essentially a 
Mayo redux, the court found ineligible a patent claiming 
methods for detecting myeloperoxidase (“MPO”) in patients 
and correlating the results to cardiovascular risk.144 Similar 
to the detection of metabolite levels in Mayo, the patentees 
collected MPO data from a large population to come up with 
a control value to determine a test subject’s risk of dis-
ease.145 The patent claims consisted of  
[a] method of assessing a test subject’s risk . . . com-
prising comparing levels of [MPO] in a bodily sample 
. . . with levels . . . in comparable bodily samples from 
control subjects . . . wherein the levels of [MPO] . . . 
relative to the levels . . . from control subjects is in-
dicative of the extent of the test subject’s risk of hav-
ing atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.146  
The court found that the “patents are directed to multi-
step methods for observing the law of nature that MPO cor-
relates to cardiovascular disease.”147 The patentees attempt-
ed to analogize to the hepatocyte preservation technique in 
CellzDirect by arguing that the steps of isolating, quantify-
ing, and comparing the amount of detected MPO to a control 
 
142 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
143 Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
144 Id. at 1355, 1363. 
145 Id. at 1362. 
146 Id. at 1356. 
147 Id. at 1360. 
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were “man-made endeavors building upon the natural 
law.”148 The court disagreed and held that the claims were 
not directed to a “new and useful laboratory technique,” as 
was the case in CellzDirect.149 The patent then failed step 
two of the analysis because the claims “require only conven-
tional MPO detection methods and compare those values to 
. . . values derived from conventional statistical methods.”150 
Although three of the method claims in this case were in-
eligible because of their similarity to those in Mayo, a fourth 
claim was not. The distinguishing aspect of this claim was a 
step that requires “administering a lipid lowering agent to 
the selected human patient.”151 As noted earlier, however, a 
claim with this level of specificity is not very valuable. For 
instance, the infringement claim in Cleveland Clinic was 
dismissed because defendant lab’s actions were limited to de-
tecting and reporting MPO levels and did not extend to the 
actual treatment.152 Because doctors rather than the labs are 
the parties responsible for ultimately administering treat-
ments, the labs are immune to direct infringement suits.153 
Furthermore, most diagnostic patentees would not want to 
risk alienating physicians by suing them. Thus, although a 
patent claiming a diagnostic method that includes an actual 
treatment step can escape the “directed to” filter in the § 101 






148 Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Cleveland Clinic Found., 
v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1776). 
149 Cleveland Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1362 (citing Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. 
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
150 Id. at 1363–64. 
151 Id. 
152 See id. at 1364–65. 
153 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
A. Applying This Interpretation to Federal Circuit 
Precedent 
Although the court and the USPTO assert that the 
CellzDirect decision is not contrary to the existing jurispru-
dence, the reasoning in that case can be applied to find eligi-
ble the biotechnology patents previously invalidated by the 
Federal Circuit. Before CellzDirect, the Federal Circuit 
heard three biotechnology cases post-Alice.154 Using the rea-
soning of CellzDirect, an argument can be made that the two 
cases assessing patents not directed towards a diagnostic 
method should have been decided differently. 
In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., the patent-
ees discovered the existence of cell-free fetal paternal cffDNA 
circulating in pregnant women’s blood.155 Because this 
cffDNA is easily accessed via the mother’s blood, it made ge-
netic analysis of the fetus safer.156 The patent claimed “am-
plifying a paternally inherited nucleic acid from the serum or 
plasma sample and detecting the presence of a paternally 
inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample.”157 It fur-
ther claimed “certain methods of using cffDNA” by “perform-
ing nucleic acid analysis on the amplified nucleic acid to de-
tect paternally inherited fetal nucleic acid.”158 The Federal 
Circuit rejected these claims because the patentees had not 
“created or altered any of the genetic information encoded in 
the cffDNA.”159 The court determined that the claims were 
directed to the existence of cffDNA itself and that the ampli-
 
154 See ELIGIBILITY COURT DECISIONS, supra note 35. The cases are: In 
re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test, 774 F.3d 775 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015); and Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
155 Sequenom, 788 F.3d at 1373. 
156 See id. 
157 Id. at 1374. 
158 Id. at 1373–74. 
159 Id. at 1376. 
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fication and analysis steps were well understood, conven-
tional, and routine.160  
However, because the actual claims were specific methods 
of analyzing a fetus’s DNA using cffDNA, the court’s holding 
seems to be an example of how almost any process can be de-
scribed in terms of natural laws, something that CellzDirect 
warned against. This Note’s suggested reading of CellzDirect 
would allow the patent to escape § 101 because the end re-
sult is a new method of analyzing fetal DNA and distinguish-
ing it from the mother’s DNA. Here, none of the claims are 
specifically directed to the cffDNA itself, but rather the de-
tection of paternally inherited DNA. Further, there is no 
mental step that compares two genetic sequences or deter-
mines an indication of a disease. 
Even if the patent fails step one for lack of a tangible end 
product, under the second step of analysis one can argue that 
because scientists never looked in maternal blood for cffDNA 
prior to the invention, the combination of conventional steps 
is enough to transform them into an inventive application. In 
this context, the steps comprising the analysis of cffDNA can 
hardly be considered conventional. Just as the prior art 
taught away from freezing hepatocytes twice in CellzDirect, 
the prior art here taught away from retaining the cffDNA in 
the first place.161 It is important to note that the most obvi-
ous application of this method is in detecting—or diagnos-
ing—certain genetic defects in the fetus. However, the patent 
claims at issue were not directed to any diagnostic step. They 
were directed to a novel application of the mother’s blood—
mainly detection and analysis of cffDNA.162 In addition, the 
CellzDirect court specifically noted that the Supreme Court 
stated, “Had Myriad created an innovative method of ma-
nipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes, it could have sought a method patent. But the pro-
cesses used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well understood 
 
160 Id. at 1377–78. 
161 Id. at 1380. 
162 Id. at 1375. 
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. . . and are not at issue in this case.”163 In Sequenom, the 
claims also detailed specific steps to distinguish and separate 
the cffDNA from the mother’s DNA.164 The method of isolat-
ing paternally inherited DNA by analyzing the cffDNA was 
not well understood or conventional. Thus, because the 
claims at issue are not diagnostic methods, the cffDNA pa-
tent should be held eligible under the suggested reading of 
CellzDirect. 
Significantly, this is the outcome many of the Federal 
Circuit judges would have reached. Judge Linn, concurring, 
stated:  
I join the court’s opinion invalidating the claims of 
the ‘540 patent only because I am bound by the 
sweeping language of the test set out in Mayo . . . In 
my view, the breadth of the second part of the test 
was unnecessary to the decision reached in Mayo. 
This case represents the consequence—perhaps unin-
tended—of that broad language in excluding a meri-
torious invention from the patent protection it de-
serves and should have been entitled to retain.165 
 In addition, on petition for rehearing en banc, Judges 
Lourie, Moore, Dyk, and Newman agreed that the patents 
should not have been invalidated on § 101 grounds. In an 
opinion concurring with the denial of the petition for rehear-
ing, Judge Lourie wrote that the claims “should not be pa-
tent-ineligible on the ground that they set forth natural laws 
or are abstractions.”166 Nevertheless, he concurred in deny-
ing the petition because he could “find no principled basis to 
distinguish this case from Mayo.”167 
 
163 Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1049 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119–20 (2013)). 
164 Sequenom, 788 F.3d at 1374. 
165 Sequenom, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring). 
166 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., concurring) (denial of petition for rehearing en 
banc). 
167 Id. at 1284. 
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In Genetic Technologies v. Merial—another case pertain-
ing to a non-diagnostic method patent—the Federal Circuit 
invalidated claims directed to “[a] method for detection of at 
least one coding region allele of a multi-allelic genetic locus” 
by amplifying a linked non-coding region using generic DNA 
amplification techniques.168 The inventors discovered the ex-
istence of these short non-coding regions, which allow much 
easier analysis of the longer linked coding regions. The court 
reasoned that the claims were “directed to a natural law—
the principle that certain non-coding and coding sequences 
are in linkage disequilibrium with one another.”169  
The claims here were also devoid of any comparison steps 
but still did not result in a tangible end-product.170 However, 
the patent claim can be considered the application of a fact—
that linked non-coding regions can detect genes in the more 
complicated coding regions—to a method for detecting and 
analyzing genes. Further, according to the USPTO, the addi-
tion of a non-conventional PCR method, such as Cool-Melt 
PCR, to analyze a specific gene satisfies the § 101 hurdle.171 
In Merial, the use of linked non-coding regions is analogous 
to the Cool-Melt PCR method. It would follow that if this 
claim was directed to a new method of PCR, the standard 
method of gene amplification, it should survive the § 101 fil-
ter. Again, the end result here would not be information but 
a sample of amplified genes that can be later analyzed akin 
to the hepatocyte pools in CellzDirect. 
In addition, the second step of CellzDirect applies to 
Merial. Before the discovery, the prior art taught away from 
analyzing the non-coding regions just as the prior art in 
hepatocyte preservation taught away from multiple freeze 
steps.172 It is important to note that the Federal Circuit did 
not lament its finding of ineligibility as it did in Sequenom, 
which is likely explained by the fact that the question of 
 
168 Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
169 Id. at 1377. 
170 See id. at 1379. 
171 EXAMPLES: LIFE SCIENCES, supra note 123. 
172 Merial, 818 F.3d at 1373. 
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preemption loomed large in Merial.173 However, the issue of 
whether claims are appropriately limited should be analyzed 
under requirements of patentability in § 112.174 
Finally, applying the CellzDirect analysis to the lone di-
agnostic case, In the matter of BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based He-
reditary Cancer Test, leads to ineligibility.175 In BRCA1 & 
BRCA2, the natural discovery was that certain mutations in 
the BRCA genes are linked to increased risk of breast can-
cer.176 Although the genes themselves were held unpatenta-
ble in Myriad, the claims at issue on remand in the Federal 
Circuit were methods which called for “comparing” a pa-
tient’s BRCA gene with wild type BRCA genes using stand-
ard DNA replication techniques.177 They further provided 
that “a difference in the sequence of the BRCA1 gene, 
BRCA1 RNA, or BRCA1 cDNA of the subject from wild-type 
indicates an alteration in the BRCA1 gene in said sub-
ject.”178 The court invalidated the claims and ruled that they 
“are directed to the patent-ineligible abstract idea of compar-
ing BRCA sequences and determining the existence of alter-
ations.”179 For the second step, the court found that the se-
quencing techniques “do nothing more than spell out what 
 
173 Id. at 1375 (“Claim 1 covers any comparison, for any purpose, of 
any non-coding region sequence known to be linked with a coding region 
allele at a multi-allelic locus . . . . Claim 1 broadly covers essentially all 
applications, via standard experimental techniques, of the law of linkage 
disequilibrium to the problem of detecting coding sequences of DNA.”).  
174 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., concurring) (denial of petition for rehearing en 
banc) (“The claims might be indefinite or too broad in that they do not 
specify how to amplify and detect, or how to separate, detect, and diag-
nose. Or they perhaps attempt to claim all known methods of carrying out 
those steps. But the finer filter of § 112 might be better suited to treating 
these as questions of patentability, rather than reviewing them under the 
less-defined eligibility rules.”).  
175 In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test, 774 F.3d 
755 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
176 Id. at 758. 
177 Id. at 764. 
178 Id. at 762. 
179 Id. at 764. 
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practitioners already knew—how to compare gene sequences 
using routine, ordinary techniques.”180  
Under the anti-diagnostic interpretation of CellzDirect, 
the claims in BRCA1 & BRCA2 could only be saved by add-
ing a clause stating that the existence of a BRCA mutation 
indicates increased risk of breast cancer and suggesting 
some specific form of treatment for such patients. In this hy-
pothetical, the patent would be akin to the method claims 
approved by CellzDirect and Cleveland Clinic. The treatment 
of patients with an increased risk of breast cancer can be 
considered the “new and useful end” of applying the natural 
law that BRCA mutations are linked to increased breast 
cancer risk.181 In this way, the claims can be considered as 
not being directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea but ra-
ther to a novel application of it. Of course, a patent claim 
this specific would be easy to circumvent and thus not very 
valuable. 
B. The Problem with Denying Patent Eligibility to All 
Diagnostic Methods 
Although the CellzDirect decision might help biotechnolo-
gy patents that are not diagnostics, there remains tension 
over the disparity in decisions regarding diagnosis and 
treatment of disease. The former is “directed to” the natural 
law because of the relationship between an indication of a 
disease and the natural law that allows this diagnosis, while 
the latter is not “directed to” the natural law. Why is treat-
ing a disease considered a useful process but diagnosing one 
not? Seemingly the only difference is that a diagnosis 
amounts to a mental step. But what about a claim for a new 
way of treating a disease where the choice of drug depends 
on the diagnostic? Why can’t the diagnostic step be the in-
ventive step? Perhaps the USPTO and Federal Circuit could 
create a special category for diagnostics like they did for 
 
180 Id. at 765. 
181 Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 
(2014)). 
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products of nature in light of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.182 
However, without a Supreme Court case holding a diagnostic 
patent eligible akin to that in Chakrabarty, there would be 
no guidelines for evaluating this special category. Although 
some in the patent community would like to see this happen, 
because the Supreme Court has not made any indication of 
relaxing its restrictive standard in Mayo, speculation of this 
hypothetical category seems best left for a later day.183 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, in its recent forays into patent eligi-
bility, has taken an extremely anti-patent position by broad-
ly applying the law of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
stract idea exceptions. While the Supreme Court presented a 
far-reaching test in Mayo and Alice that potentially invali-
dates any patent tied to discoveries in the life sciences on the 
basis of § 101, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rapid Litiga-
tion Management v. CellzDirect, Inc. seems to have given 
hope to the biotechnology industry. A plausible interpreta-
tion of the decision would limit the Mayo/Alice analysis to 
patents in which the end result is a mental step. This essen-
tially restricts the test’s invalidation reach to pure diagnostic 
methods. This would be consistent with the USPTO’s guide-
lines and could lead to a separate analysis method for diag-
nostics much like the USPTO’s treatment of products of na-
ture. Whether the Supreme Court will approve of this 
development by the Federal Circuit is yet to be seen, but 
having recently denied certiorari in Sequenom and CellzDi-
rect, the Court seems content to allow the Federal Circuit to 
continue to resolve this issue.184  
 
182 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 
EXAMPLES: NATURE-BASED PRODUCTS (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter EXAM-
PLES: NATURE-BASED PRODUCTS], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/mdc_examples_nature-based_products.pdf [perma.cc/5XKL-
6G2Q]. 
183 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 
21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015). 
184 Dennis Crouch, Not Eligible: Supreme Court Denies All Pending 
Subject Matter Eligibility Petitions, PATENTLYO (Oct. 3, 2016), 
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APPENDIX 
A. The Development of Patent Eligibility Under § 101 
Title 35 of the United States Code codifies patent law. 
§ 101 defines the subject matter that may be patented: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
for, subject to the conditions and requirements of this ti-
tle.”185 
The text of the statute requires that a patent be directed 
to one of four categories of acceptable subject matter: process 
(chemical, mechanical, or electrical procedures, such as a 
method for refining petroleum or a method embodied in a 
computer program), machine (mechanisms with moving 
parts, such as a motor), manufacture (man-made products, 
such as a hand tool), or composition of matter (chemical 
compounds, combinations, or mixtures, such as a plastic).186 
On its face, the statute takes an expansive view on patent el-
igibility. The categories are broad and modified by the unlim-
ited word “any,” and notably, the statute does not specify any 
ineligible categories.187 This seemingly limitless threshold is, 
however, “subject to the conditions and requirements of th[e] 
title,”188 namely novelty (that an invention be different from 
prior inventions and represent an advancement over prior 
knowledge),189 non-obviousness (that a person of ordinary 
skill in the art presented with the prior art would not find 




185 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
186 See generally Timothy A. Brisson & Victor Gallo, Patent Law Ba-
sics, NEV. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 10; Gary M. Ropski & Michael J. Kline, A 
Primer on Intellectual Property Rights: The Basics of Patents, Trademarks, 
Copyrights, Trade Secrets and Related Rights, 50 ALB. L. REV. 405 (1986). 
187 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
188 Id. 
189 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
190 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
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disclose the invention with adequate specificity).191 The 
statute’s structure differentiates eligibility from the remain-
ing patentability requirements under Title 35. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court clarified that § 101 is to be in-
terpreted broadly, recognizing that Congress, when recodify-
ing the Patent Act in 1952, intended its “wide scope”192 to 
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”193 
Although the § 101 categories are expansive, the Supreme 
Court created three specific and narrow exceptions to patent 
eligible subject matter: the “laws of nature, physical [or nat-
ural] phenomena, and abstract ideas.”194 
1. Eligibility Prior to the 1952 Patent Act 
In Le Roy v. Tatham, one of the earliest § 101 cases, the 
Court ruled that a new property of lead alloy used in pipe by 
itself was not patent eligible.195 It reasoned that a “principle, 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; [and] these cannot be patented, as no one can claim 
in either of them an exclusive right.”196 However, the Court 
clarified that a principle “when practically applied, in the 
construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, 
is patentable.”197 Thus, the Court created the first of the 
three exceptions to patent eligibility—the laws of nature—
while allowing for practical applications of the principle.198 
Just one year later, the Court evaluated Samuel Morse’s 
telegraph in describing the patentability of an application of 
 
191 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). See also Ropski & Kline, supra note 186, at 
409. 
192 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
193 S. Rep. No. 82–1979, at 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 82–1923, at 6 
(1952). 
194 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. See also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593, 601 (2010). 
195 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 176 (1852). 
196 Id. at 175. 
197 Id. 
198 Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 
85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 335 (2010). 
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a natural principle.199 It invalidated Morse’s claim which 
broadly covered any “effect produced by the use of electro-
magnetism distinct from the process or machinery necessary 
to produce it.”200 Although Morse invented just one way of 
manipulating electric or galvanic current to mark or print in-
telligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance, his claim 
sought to protect all applications of electromagnetism to 
achieve this result.201 The Court deemed it improper to grant 
Morse a “monopoly in [using electromagnetism], however de-
veloped, for the purpose of printing at a distance.”202 The 
Court thus reiterated its stance in Le Roy that a “newly-
discovered principle” was not patentable even if it was 
cloaked in language that described it as a “process.”203 
Fifty years later, the Court increased the bite of § 101 in 
American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex by determining whether 
an orange dipped in a borax solution to prevent mold consti-
tuted a “manufacture.”204 The Court rejected the assertion 
that because “[t]he product is a combination of the natural 
fruit and a boric compound[,] . . . [t]he complete article is not 
found in nature and is thus an article of manufacture.”205 In-
stead, the Court concluded:  
Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not 
produce from the raw material an article for use 
which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property . . . There is no change in the name, appear-
ance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a 
fresh orange fit only for the same beneficial uses as 
theretofore.206  
The decision seemed to discount the patent because the 
“natural article” (i.e., the orange) was still an orange even 
 
199 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
200 Id. at 120. 
201 Id. at 112. 
202 Id. at 113. 
203 Id. at 117. 
204 Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
205 Id. at 11. 
206 Id. at 11–12. 
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though the “added substance” (i.e., the borax) provided pro-
tection from mold thus providing a “new and useful” overall 
product.207 
Before the 1952 Patent Act, the Court further elaborated 
on the natural phenomena exception in combination patents 
in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co..208 The un-
derlying invention in Funk Brothers was created by combin-
ing various Rhizobia capable of inoculating the seeds of 
plants belonging to several cross-inoculation groups.209 Alt-
hough each species of Rhizobia was known to protect certain 
legumes, no one species protected all legumes.210 Further-
more, attempts to combine various species were unsuccessful 
because the combinations of Rhizobia inhibited each other.211 
The inventor discovered that certain strains do not exert a 
mutually inhibitive effect on each other.212 “Thus, he provid-
ed a mixed culture of Rhizobia capable of inoculating the 
seeds of plants belonging to several cross-inoculation groups” 
without inhibition.213 In denying the patent, the Court ruled 
that while the “methods of selecting and testing non-
inhibitive strains are patentable,” the product itself was 
not.214 The product was not patentable because the inventor 
did not “create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the 
bacteria,” rather, “[t]heir qualities are the work of nature.”215 
Thus, Funk Brothers further cemented the natural phenom-
ena judicial exception. 
 
207 1-1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02 (MB 2017).  
208 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
209 Id. 




214 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
215 Id. 
KIM – FINAL 
1194 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
2. The 1952 Patent Act and the Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr Trilogy 
Two decades after Congress enacted the modern Patent 
Act in 1952, the Supreme Court waded into the § 101 waters 
again in Gottschalk v. Benson.216 In Benson, the Court de-
nied patent protection for a process of converting binary-
coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers.217 The 
claims “purported to cover any use of the claimed method in 
a general-purpose digital computer of any type.”218 While the 
Court refused to preclude all computer programs, it noted 
that a patent could not claim an idea itself.219 The Court 
added that “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathe-
matical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on 
the algorithm itself.”220 The Benson decision, along with 
those in Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr, outlined the 
third § 101 exception—the abstract idea. 
In Flook, the Court rejected the application of an ineligi-
ble mathematical formula even when confined to a specific 
application in an alarm system relating to the catalytic con-
verter process.221 The inventor asserted that because the al-
gorithm has uses outside of the alarm system it was not at-
tempting to “wholly pre-empt” the formula itself.222 The 
Court rejected the argument and noted that a “phenomenon 
of nature or mathematical formula . . . cannot support a pa-
tent unless there is some other inventive concept in its appli-
cation.”223 
The final case in the abstract idea trilogy came in 1981, 
just a year before the advent of the Federal Circuit. The pa-
tent at issue in Diehr concerned a process for curing synthet-
ic rubber “so that the product will retain its shape and be 
 
216 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
217 Id. at 64. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 71. 
220 Id. at 71–72. 
221 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
222 Id. at 589. 
223 Id. at 594. 
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functionally operative after the molding is completed.”224 
Although well-known mathematical formulas using time, 
temperature, and cure relationships existed to determine the 
optimal time to stop the curing process, the industry previ-
ously could not make the necessary computations because no 
one could properly measure the temperature inside the mold. 
The patent claimed a process of constantly measuring the 
temperature inside a mold and automatically feeding it into 
a computer to repeatedly recalculate the cure time using the 
formula. In holding the patent valid, the Court explained 
that the mere use of a mathematical formula did not pre-
clude it from patent protection because the claim had to be 
considered as a whole.225 
Through Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Court outlined 
three important considerations for the § 101 analysis. It cre-
ated the abstract idea exception, stated that a limited appli-
cation of a § 101 exception is not valid absent some other in-
ventive concept, and established that a patent claim is to be 
considered as a whole.226 
3. Chakrabarty and Products of Nature 
In addition to the abstract idea trilogy, the Supreme 
Court again took up patentability of living organisms and 
natural products in 1980 with Diamond v. Chakrabarty. The 
Chakrabarty patent described a man-made bacterium capa-
ble of digesting oil.227 In holding that the oil-eating bacte-
rium was patent eligible, the Court ruled that any “product 
of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character and 
use” could be patentable.228 The Court noted that the proper 
“distinction was not between living and inanimate things, 
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and 
 
224 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
225 Id. at 187. 
226 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Flook, 437 U.S. 
at 590–91; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. 
227 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
228 Id. at 309–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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human-made inventions.”229 This decision led to a specific 
products of nature category analyzed separately from the 
other exceptions.230 
4. Recent Supreme Court Cases: Bilski, Mayo, 
Myriad, and Alice 
After the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, the Su-
preme Court mostly stayed out of the patent eligibility realm 
until the Bilski v. Kappos decision in 2010.231 In Bilski, the 
Court held that a patent claiming a process of economic 
hedging in commodities trading was ineligible as an abstract 
idea.232 Still, the majority refused to preclude all business 
method patents and emphasized § 101’s role as a threshold 
requirement, subject to patentability under §§ 102, 103 and 
112.233 The Court also rejected the machine-or-
transformation test used by the Federal Circuit in which a 
process is eligible only if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine 
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”234 Although the outcome was un-
controversial, by leaving the door open to business methods 
and rejecting the bright line rule developed by the Federal 
Circuit, the Court arguably did nothing to clarify the § 101 
analysis. 
The result in Bilski did little to narrow patent eligibility 
any more than the abstract idea trilogy,235 but the Supreme 
Court’s next decision in Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Pro-
metheus Labs severely limited the patenting of diagnostic 
methods in healthcare.236 In what was seen as an effort to 
 
229 Id. at 313. 
230 See EXAMPLES: NATURE-BASED PRODUCTS, supra note 182. 
231 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); see Golden, supra note 31, at 
1768.  
232 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612.  
233 Id. at 602, 606–607.  
234 Id. at 600, 602 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
235 See Appendix I.B, infra.  
236 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 
(2012). See Sanzo, supra note 6, at 11 (“The first case in the demise of pa-
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prevent patents from tying up “the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work,” the Supreme Court held that a 
method of diagnostic testing, used to determine the optimal 
dosage of autoimmune-disease drugs by monitoring certain 
metabolites in a patient’s blood, was directed to a law of na-
ture and therefore invalid.237 The patent described a process 
of administering the drug and determining the level of drug 
metabolites in the patient, wherein the level of metabolites 
outside of a certain range indicated a need to alter the 
amount of the drug to enhance efficacy while reducing toxici-
ty.238  
Importantly, the Court framed the question presented as 
whether the “patent claims add enough to their statements 
of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to 
qualify as patent eligible processes that apply natural 
laws.”239 The crux of the invention was the specific metabo-
lite to monitor and the range described in the patent 
claim.240 The step of administering the drug had already 
been in practice, and the methods for monitoring metabolite 
levels were well known in the prior art.241 The Court addi-
tionally stated that the wherein step “simply [told] a doctor 
about the relevant natural laws, at most adding a suggestion 
that he should take those laws into account when treating 
his patient.”242  
It further noted that “those steps, when viewed as a 
whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts 
taken separately.”243 Although the Court acknowledged the 
need to look at the whole claim as described in its Diehr 
precedent, it severely limited patent eligibility under § 101 
by separating the parts of the claim and essentially applying 
 
tentable gene based diagnostic methods was Mayo Collaborative Services 
v. Prometheus Laboratories.”). 
237 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71–72.   
238 Id. at 74. 
239 Id. at 77. 
240 Id. at 79. 
241 Id. at 78–79. 
242 Id. at 78. 
243 Id. at 80. 
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the § 102 novelty analysis to them. Thus, it undermined the 
statements in Bilski that § 101 is to be treated as a threshold 
requirement. 
The Supreme Court followed up its decision in Mayo by 
striking another blow to biotechnology patents in Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.244 One of the patent claims in-
volved Myriad’s synthetically created cDNA, which contained 
only the amino-acid-coding exon portions of the naturally oc-
curring DNA of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—two genes re-
lated to breast cancer.245 The Court used reasoning similar 
to that in Chakrabarty, which involved a genetically engi-
neered bacterium, to hold that the cDNA was a valid product 
claim because although the “cDNA retains the naturally oc-
curring exons of DNA . . . it is distinct from the DNA from 
which it was derived.”246  
The other set of claims at issue gave the inventor the ex-
clusive right to isolate and sequence an individual’s BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes.247 In effect, the patent would give the in-
ventor exclusive rights to use genetic analysis of the BRCA 
genes for diagnostic purposes. In a short opinion, the Court 
denied patent eligibility because “Myriad did not create or 
alter any of the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes.”248 The Court reasoned that Myriad’s 
“principal contribution was uncovering the precise location 
and genetic sequence” of the genes.249 Even though isolated 
DNA encoding BRCA1 and BRCA2 do not exist in nature 
and all people may have slight differences in the genetic se-
quences of the genes, the claims were necessarily focused on 
the information encoded in the DNA rather than the particu-
lar molecule itself.250 Thus, the Court likened the claims for 
the DNA sequence to the bacteria mixture held ineligible in 
 
244 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2117, 2120 (2013). 
245 Id. at 2112–13. 
246 Id. at 2119. 
247 Id. at 2113. 
248 Id. at 2117. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 2118–19.  
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Funk Brothers rather than the genetically engineered bacte-
rium held eligible in Chakrabarty.251 
Similarly, in order to deny patent protection for innova-
tions that are fundamentally non-technological in nature, 
the Court ruled in Alice that a method, which mitigated set-
tlement risk in financial transactions by using a computer 
system as a third-party intermediary, was invalid for being 
directed to an abstract idea.252 In so doing, it applied the 
two-step framework suggested in Mayo for distinguishing a 
patent-ineligible concept, as opposed to an application of the 
patent-ineligible concept.253  
In step one, a court must determine whether a patent 
claim at issue is “directed to” one of three patent ineligible 
concepts: law of nature, natural or physical phenomenon, or 
abstract idea. If the answer is yes, the court must then 
search for an “inventive concept” that transforms the nature 
of the claim into a patent-eligible application.254 In Alice, the 
Court—in another short opinion—summarily found that the 
patent claims were directed to the abstract idea of interme-
diated settlement.255  
For the second step, it ruled that “method claims, which 
merely require generic computer implementation, fail to 
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible inven-
tion.”256 Because this did not add anything of “substance” to 
the underlying abstract concept, which had been done in the 
prior art by humans, the claims were held patent-
ineligible.257 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo and Al-
ice have left the patent eligibility criterion unclear at best.258 
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